Ankit Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh: Supreme Court Upholds Anticipatory Bail Despite Criminal History (2025)

Case Details

This criminal appeal was adjudicated by the Supreme Court of India, comprising a bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra. The judgment was delivered on 17 April 2025, in Criminal Appeal No. 2037 of 2025, which arose from Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 14566 of 2024. The proceeding was an appeal against an order granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The statutory framework involved Sections 195A, 294, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The nature of the proceeding was a challenge by the de facto complainant (the appellant) to the Madhya Pradesh High Court's order granting anticipatory bail to the second respondent, Abdul Razzak.

Facts

The factual matrix originated from an incident on 30 March 2023, at approximately 1:00 PM. The appellant, Ankit Mishra, accompanied by his friend Sandeep Dubey, was at Victoria Hospital in Jabalpur for a checkup. The second respondent, Abdul Razzak, was also present on the hospital premises for his Medicolegal Case (MLC) in connection with a separate criminal case. Upon seeing the appellant, respondent no. 2 became agitated. He allegedly hurled obscene abuses, used derogatory language, and extended death threats. The specific threat was directed at coercing the appellant to withdraw a prior complaint he had lodged against respondent no. 2 and to change his testimony in that case, with a warning that failure to comply would endanger the appellant and his family members. Based on the appellant's complaint, First Information Report (FIR) No. 176 of 2023 was registered the same day at Police Station Omti, District Jabalpur, under Sections 195A (threatening or inducing any person to give false evidence), 294 (obscene acts and songs), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC. The appellant's statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was subsequently recorded, reiterating these allegations. The appellant, challenging the anticipatory bail, emphasized that respondent no. 2 was a known habitual offender with an extensive criminal history, including 45 registered FIRs and a prior conviction leading to a two-year imprisonment sentence. The State of Madhya Pradesh also opposed the bail, though its separate special leave petition against the same impugned order had been dismissed by the Supreme Court earlier in October 2024.

Issues

The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were: (1) Whether the High Court erred in law by granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. to an accused with an extensive and serious criminal history, including allegations of being a habitual offender. (2) Whether the order granting anticipatory bail was liable to be interfered with and cancelled by the Supreme Court in appeal, applying the established principles governing the cancellation of bail. (3) Whether the nature of the alleged offences in the present FIR, being triable by a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, and not carrying a sentence exceeding seven years, was a determinative factor in the exercise of discretion for granting anticipatory bail despite a problematic criminal record.

Rule / Law

The governing statutory provisions were Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides for the grant of anticipatory bail, and Sections 195A, 294, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which define the alleged offences. The legal principles relied upon by the court were primarily drawn from the precedent set in Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2022) 8 SCC 559, which comprehensively outlined the grounds and illustrative circumstances for the cancellation of bail. The court also referenced the principles from Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118; and Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, (2011) 6 SCC 189. The central doctrine applied was that cancellation of bail requires very cogent and overwhelming circumstances and is not to be done mechanically. The court reiterated that a superior court can interfere with a bail order if it suffers from a non-application of mind, is founded on irrelevant considerations, overlooks relevant factors like criminal history, or is perverse, whimsical, or capricious.

Analysis

The Supreme Court's analysis proceeded in a structured, two-stage manner. First, it meticulously laid down the overarching legal principles governing the cancellation of bail, drawing extensively from the Deepak Yadav precedent. Second, it applied these principles to the specific factual matrix of the case to test the validity of the High Court's anticipatory bail order.

The court commenced its analysis by underscoring the settled law that bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner. It emphasized the necessity for very cogent and overwhelming circumstances to justify cancellation. The judgment then systematically enumerated the grounds for cancellation as crystallized in Dolat Ram's case, which include: (i) interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice; (ii) evasion of justice; (iii) abuse of the concession of bail; (iv) possibility of absconding; (v) likelihood or actual misuse of bail; and (vi) likelihood of tampering with evidence or threatening witnesses.

Moving beyond the presence of supervening circumstances, the court, following Deepak Yadav, elaborated on the illustrative circumstances where bail can be cancelled even in their absence. This part of the analysis forms the doctrinal bedrock for reviewing the impugned bail order. The court listed seven such circumstances: (1) where the bail-granting court considers irrelevant material of a substantial nature while ignoring relevant material; (2) where it overlooks the influential position of the accused vis-à-vis the victim or witnesses; (3) where it completely ignores the past criminal record and conduct of the accused; (4) where bail is granted on untenable grounds; (5) where serious discrepancies in the order cause prejudice to justice; (6) where the grant was inappropriate given the serious nature of the charges disentitling the accused to bail; and (7) where the order is apparently whimsical, capricious, or perverse.

The court further fortified this position by citing Neeru Yadav, which draws a critical distinction between cancelling bail due to post-grant misconduct and setting aside an order that was unjustified, illegal, and perverse at its inception. It quoted the precedent to clarify that in the latter scenario, the superior court delves into the justifiability and soundness of the original order itself, not subsequent violations. This principle was reinforced by the quote from Mahipal, which holds that an appellate court must assess whether the bail order suffers from non-application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence, considering the seriousness of the crime and severity of punishment.

Having established this rigorous legal framework, the court then applied it to the facts. The appellant's primary contention was that the High Court committed a fundamental error by granting anticipatory bail to a habitual offender with 45 FIRs. The Supreme Court, however, scrutinized the High Court's order and found that it had not ignored the criminal history of respondent no. 2. The analysis notes that the High Court had indeed dealt with the previous criminal cases. The Supreme Court observed that while most cases were from 1991-2012, resulting in acquittals or bail, and there was a gap from 2012-2021, other FIRs were registered from August 2021 onwards, including a case under the National Security Act (which was later quashed by the Supreme Court).

The pivotal point in the application of law to facts turned on the nature and gravity of the instant offences. The court conducted a detailed examination of the charges. It noted that all alleged offences in FIR No. 176 of 2023—Sections 195A, 294, and 506 IPC—were triable by a Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Crucially, none of these offences carried a maximum sentence of more than seven years of imprisonment. The court specifically analyzed Section 195A, noting that the offence in relation to which the threats were allegedly extended (the subject of the earlier complaint) was also triable by a Magistrate. Consequently, the present offences under Section 195A would similarly be triable by a Magistrate. This categorization was legally significant. The court explicitly held that the present offence was not triable by a Court of Session and did not carry a sentence of more than seven years, thereby placing it outside the category of "heinous" offences for the purpose of this bail consideration.

The court acknowledged the principle that habitual offenders should not ordinarily be released on bail in a routine manner. However, it found that the High Court had elaborately dealt with the criminal cases against the accused and had imposed conditions. The Supreme Court reasoned that the consideration for cancellation must be tested on whether the High Court committed a serious error of law. It concluded that had the accused been alleged to have committed a heinous offence, the consideration would have been decidedly different. The absence of heinous characteristics in the present charges was the differentiating factor that justified the High Court's exercise of discretion, even in the face of a lengthy criminal record.

The court also addressed the practical circumstance that respondent no. 2 was already in jail for other offences. The High Court's grant of anticipatory bail in this case was seen as a preventive measure to ensure he was not arrested in this particular case merely to prolong his incarceration if released on bail in the other cases. The Supreme Court found this consideration not to be perverse or illegal.

Ultimately, the analysis concluded that the High Court's view did not suffer from any fundamental error of law. It was not a perverse, capricious, or whimsical order. The High Court had considered the relevant factor (criminal history) but had weighed it against the nature of the current, non-heinous charges. It had not overlooked this history, nor had it granted bail on untenable grounds. Therefore, none of the illustrative circumstances warranting cancellation from the Deepak Yadav case were found to be present. The Supreme Court thus affirmed that the threshold for appellate interference—a fundamental legal error or a perverse decision—was not met.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeal, thereby upholding the impugned order dated 10 April 2024 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which had granted anticipatory bail to respondent no. 2, Abdul Razzak. The legal basis for the dismissal was the court's finding that the High Court's discretion was exercised judiciously, considering the non-heinous nature of the offences triable by a Magistrate, and that the order did not exhibit any fundamental error of law warranting cancellation under the stringent principles established in Deepak Yadav and related precedents. However, acknowledging the appellant's and State's legitimate concerns regarding the accused's criminal record, the Supreme Court imposed an additional condition: upon his release on bail in other cases, respondent no. 2 must report to the concerned police station on the first or second day of every month during the trial's pendency and must not engage in any other criminal activity. The court clarified that any breach of this condition would entitle the appellant or the State to move the High Court for cancellation of the anticipatory bail.